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HAUERWAS AND DISABILITY LAW: 
EXPOSING THE CRACKS IN THE 
FOUNDATIONS OF DISABILITY LAW 
ELIZABETH R. SCHILTZ* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Stanley Hauerwas argues that “[n]o group exposes the pretensions of the 
humanism that shapes the practices of modernity more thoroughly than the 
mentally handicapped.”1 He describes people with intellectual disabilities2 as 
“the crack I desperately needed to give concreteness to my critique of 
modernity.”3 Indeed, modern practices with respect to the mentally 
handicapped are undeniably puzzling. On the one hand, advances in the ability 
to prenatally diagnose genetic conditions that cause mental retardation are 
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 1.  Stanley Hauerwas, Timeful Friends: Living with the Handicapped, in CRITICAL REFLECTIONS 
ON STANLEY HAUERWAS’ THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY 11, 14 (John Swinton ed., 2004) [hereinafter 
Hauerwas, Timeful Friends]. 
 2.  The focus of this article is people with intellectual, rather than physical, disabilities. The 
appropriate terminology for this population can be problematic. This is graphically illustrated by the 
different terms Hauerwas himself has used over the past thirty years of his writings on this topic—
including the quotes in this article—that track the evolving conventions of the subject. See Simi Linton, 
Reassigning Meaning, in THE DISABILITY STUDIES READER 223, 223–28 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 2010) 
(describing evolving usages). Although I typically use the “people first” terminology currently favored 
by most disability advocates, see, e.g., Kathie Snow, People First Language, DISABILITY IS NATURAL 
(May 2012), http://www.disabilityisnatural.com/images/PDF/pfl09.pdf—preferring, for example, 
“people with intellectual disabilities” over “the mentally retarded”—this article sometimes refers 
simply to “the disabled” in the interest of brevity. These references should be understood to refer 
primarily to people with intellectual, rather than physical, disabilities.  
 3.  Hauerwas, Timeful Friends, supra note 1, at 14. 
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widely heralded and enthusiastically embraced, as evidenced by the declining 
numbers of children born with Down Syndrome worldwide, despite advancing 
maternal ages that should be causing those numbers to increase.4 On the other 
hand, laws expressing a strong commitment to the equal treatment of our fellow 
citizens with disabilities continue to be enacted, typically with overwhelming 
support, since the passage of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act in 
19755 (“IDEA”), which ensured the education of children with disabilities in 
public schools. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 19906 (“ADA”) 
prohibited discrimination against people with disabilities in public 
accommodations and employment, and the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act of 20087 prohibited employers or health insurers from 
discriminating based on information from genetic tests. 
There are, indeed, puzzling inconsistencies in contemporary society’s 
attitudes toward the disabled—inconsistencies that Hauerwas identifies as 
evidence of the flaws of modern humanism. Humanism’s emphasis on 
rationality and capacity for reason is the most obvious target of any critique 
focused on people with intellectual disabilities, whose capacity for reason is, by 
definition, compromised to some degree. But Hauerwas focuses his critique on 
two related corollaries—namely, that autonomy and the ability to freely create 
one’s own identity constitute equally fundamental markers of humanity. 
Disability law scholar Samuel Bagenstos identifies and attempts to explain a 
series of contemporary contradictions in disability law, including those 
stemming from recent case law restricting the scope of the ADA and the debate 
about abortion after a prenatal diagnosis of a disability.8 A careful analysis of 
these arguments reveals similarities between Bagenstos’s explanations for the 
contradictions he observes and significant aspects of Hauerwas’s critique of 
modern humanism. I will argue that Bagenstos’s arguments could be 
strengthened by incorporating more completely Hauerwas’s full critique. 
Appreciating the similarities between Bagenstos’s arguments and Hauerwas’s 
insights does more than simply clarify and strengthen Bagenstos’s arguments. It 
also evidences a growing and potentially powerful convergence of theological 
and secular reflection on the thorny conundrum posed by contemporary 
society’s treatment of the significantly disabled. By joining forces, proponents 
of both religious and secular arguments might be able to work together for the 
development of a less contradictory—and more inclusive—set of laws and 
practices for people with disabilities. 
 
 4.  See infra note 120 and accompanying text.  
 5.  20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2006) (originally enacted as the Education for All Handicapped 
Children Act of 1975).  
 6.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006). 
 7.  Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881 (codified in scattered sections of 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).  
 8.  SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT (2009). 
02_SCHLITZ_CORRECTED (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2012  3:56 PM 
No. 4 2012] HAUERWAS AND DISABILITY LAW 25 
II 
HAUERWAS’S CRITIQUE OF MODERN HUMANISM:  
THE PRETENSIONS EXPOSED BY PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL DISABILITIES 
Over the course of Hauerwas’s voluminous writings about people with 
intellectual disabilities, he admits serious misgivings about instrumentalizing the 
disabled by making them a part of his intellectual agenda.9 However, he is 
unable to resist either working with or writing about such people, because by 
being “drawn into the world of the mentally handicapped,” he eventually came 
to realize that “[o]ur humanism entails we care for them once they are among 
us, once we are stuck with them; but the same humanism cannot help but think 
that, all things considered, it would be better if they did not exist.”10 The folksy 
idiom of this quote belies the complexity of its insights. Why should being 
“stuck with” people with intellectual disabilities give us a responsibility for care 
that we could otherwise evade by preventing their existence? Why should this 
intellectual epiphany—this recognition that the core idea underlying his 
substantial body of theological writing about the disabled was, in fact, a critique 
of modern humanism—only be possible for him after being “drawn into” the 
“world of the mentally handicapped”?11 
The complex layers of Hauerwas’s disability-based critique of modern 
humanism reflect the different perspectives through which he encountered the 
disabled, both personally and in his written work. Much of his earliest writing 
on the topic addressed experiences of parents of intellectually disabled 
children—a community he grew to know intimately while teaching at the 
University of Notre Dame and volunteering at a neighboring center for disabled 
children. Later writing reflected Hauerwas’s growing friendship with Jean 
Vanier, the founder of L’Arche, an international federation of small, residential 
faith-centered communities where people with and without intellectual 
disabilities live together in friendship. His work based on these personal 
encounters drew him into more theoretical engagements with philosophers of 
modern humanism, such as Immanuel Kant, John Rawls, and Martha 
Nussbaum, whose accounts of humanity Hauerwas criticizes for their failure to 
account adequately for the disabled. Hauerwas invariably judges these 
intellectual engagements to be futile, and he concludes that the witness 
provided by those living with the disabled is the strongest argument for his 
critique of modern humanism. In this part, a brief description of the modern 
humanism that Hauerwas critiques will set the stage for a discussion of what 
each of these three perspectives contributed to his critique. 
 
 9.  Hauerwas, Timeful Friends, supra note 1, at 14. 
 10.  Id.  
 11.  Id. 
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A.   A Brief Description of “Our” Modern Humanism: Rationality and its Two 
Corollaries 
Humanism is generally characterized as a philosophy concentrating on 
human values and human nature. It typically identifies the human capacity for 
self-realization as the source of universal human dignity, rather than any 
religious belief. John Swinton, the editor of the most comprehensive collection 
of Hauerwas’s writings on disability, offers a helpful description of how 
Hauerwas understands the target of his critique: 
For Hauerwas, post-Enlightenment Western culture is liberal in its worldview, 
assumptions, and expectations. Liberalism emphasizes the importance of reason, 
rationality, independence, and the capacity for self-advocacy. The assumed norm for 
authentic human living is that a person should be able to articulate their ideas 
cognitively, logically, and rationally. From the perspective of liberalism, society is 
assumed to be an association of free and independent equals. To be a “person” means 
that one must be able to live one’s life, develop one’s potential and develop a 
purposeful life-course without any necessary reference to others. Importantly, these 
capacities are not only necessary for entry into the socio-political system, they are also 
considered necessary for a person to live in a way which can be deemed authentically 
human. . . . The experience of profound developmental disabilities sits uneasily with 
the expectations, hopes, and dreams of liberal society.
12
 
Swinton’s description captures the complexity of the various dimensions of 
contemporary humanism that are particularly problematic for people with 
cognitive disabilities. The most obvious is the emphasis on reason and 
rationality. By definition, this norm assumes a capacity that is compromised to 
some extent for people with intellectual disabilities. But Hauerwas does not 
tend to focus on the capacity for reason in his critique of humanism.13 Instead, 
he focuses on two corollaries flowing from this starting point, namely that 
authentic personhood is characterized, first, by a person’s autonomy, and, 
second, by a person’s capacity for self-definition. Though these two corollaries 
are not entirely independent of each other, they are distinct. Each idea 
illuminates different aspects of modern humanism that Hauerwas finds 
particularly problematic for the disabled. 
B.   Corollary One: Autonomy is Fundamental to Personhood 
The past few decades have witnessed no dearth of criticisms of the 
presumption of autonomy as a fundamental attribute of humanity. Feminist 
legal philosophers such as Robin L. West, Martha Alberson Fineman, and Joan 
Williams have offered dependency-based theories of justice focusing on the 
particular dependency of children on their parents that in turn results in 
dependency for the care-giving parent.14 Others, such as the philosophers 
 
 12.  John Swinton, Introduction: Hauerwas on Disability, in CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON STANLEY 
HAUERWAS’ THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 1, 5.  
 13.  But see Stanley Hauerwas, The Retarded and the Criteria for the Human, in CRITICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON STANLEY HAUERWAS’ THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 127 (criticizing 
definitions of humanness applied in contemporary bioethical debates that focus exclusively on cognitive 
ability).  
 14.  MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
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Alasdair MacIntyre, Hans S. Reinders, and Eva Feder Kittay, have focused on 
the inherent dependency of the disabled in developing alternative moral or 
political philosophies based on humanity’s mutual vulnerability and 
dependency.15 
Hauerwas joins this chorus, arguing that people with intellectual disabilities 
present an uncomfortable challenge to the modernity-infused view of the self as 
autonomous by painting the more honest picture of the person as vulnerable 
and dependent: 
As much as we fear suffering, we fear more the loneliness that accompanies it. We try 
to deny our neediness as much, if not more so, to ourselves as to others. We seek to be 
strong. We seek to be self-possessed. We seek to deny that we depend on others for 
our existence. 
The retarded, therefore, are particularly troubling for us. Even if they do not suffer by 
being retarded, they are certainly people in need. Even worse, they do not try to hide 
their needs. They are not self-sufficient, they are not self-possessed, they are in need. 
Even more, they do not evidence the proper shame for being so. They simply assume 
that they are what they are and they need to provide no justification for being such. It 
is almost as if they have been given a natural grace to be free from the regret most of 
us feel for our neediness.
16
 
In addition to the power of the witness provided by this “natural grace” of 
people with disabilities, Hauerwas observes that those who care for people with 
intellectual disabilities, particularly those in voluntary associations such as the 
L’Arche communities, offer powerful prophetic witness to the possibility of a 
world that is not structured around the autonomy fallacy. The L’Arche 
communities are radical living arrangements for the disabled because they are 
characterized by their commitment to communal life marked by genuine, 
mutual friendship, rather than the more conventional commitment of fostering 
the autonomy of the disabled while providing adequate care.17 Such a genuine 
friendship depends on the mutual dependence of the friends, rather than a one-
sided dependence of the disabled on the nondisabled. Vanier explains that 
[o]ur focal point of fidelity at L’Arche is to live with handicapped people in the spirit 
of the gospel and the Beatitudes. “To live with” is different from “to do for.” It 
doesn’t simply mean eating at the same table and sleeping under the same roof. It 
means that we create relationships of gratuity, truth and interdependence, that we 
listen to the handicapped people; that we recognize and marvel at their gifts.
18
 
Hauerwas considers this witness to lives structured around mutual 
 
(2004); ROBIN L. WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997); JOAN WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY 
FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2000). For a more detailed discussion 
of this work, see Elizabeth R. Schiltz, West, MacIntyre and Wojtyła: Pope John Paul II’s Contribution to 
the Development of a Dependency-Based Theory of Justice, 45 J. CATH. L. STUD. 369 (2007). 
 15.  EVA FEDER KITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR (1999); ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT 
RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES 3 (1999); HANS L. REINDERS, THE 
FUTURE OF THE DISABLED IN LIBERAL SOCIETY (2000); HANS L. REINDERS, RECIEVING THE GIFT 
OF FRIENDSHIP (2008). 
 16.  Stanley Hauerwas, Suffering the Retarded: Should We Prevent Retardation?, in CRITICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON STANLEY HAUERWAS’ THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 87, 102.   
 17.  MICHAEL DOWNY, A BLESSED WEAKNESS 40 (1986). 
 18.  JEAN VANIER, COMMUNITY AND GROWTH 106 (1979). 
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dependency rather than autonomy to be so powerful as to be “dangerous”—
”too strong for most of us.”19 At the same time, though, he insists that “[t]heir 
witness remains crucial for the rest of us [who] are not part of their community; 
for without such examples imaginations lack the resources to know that what 
we have become used to doing is not done by necessity.”20 
C.   Corollary Two: Capacity for Self-Definition is Fundamental to Personhood 
Hauerwas captured modern humanism’s conviction that personhood is 
fundamentally characterized by man’s capacity for self-definition in his writings: 
“[W]e live in a time when people believe they have no story except the story 
they chose when they thought they had no story.”21 He asks readers to test the 
extent to which they accept this notion by reflecting on whether they think a 
person should be responsible for any decision made when they did not know 
what they were doing. Most readers do not. As Hauerwas explains, “[T]his 
ethos of freedom is deep in our souls. We believe we should be held responsible 
only for the things we freely chose when we knew what we were doing.”22 Our 
own self-definitions—our own, freely created stories—set the parameters for 
how we should be judged. 
Hauerwas draws this vivid insight from his work with parents of children 
with intellectual disabilities who are directly confronted with the fallacy that our 
personhood is fundamentally the product of our self-definition in two ways—
one of which is direct and essentially existential, the other of which is slightly 
more indirect and instrumental. 
1.   The Direct Existential Insight 
Hauerwas argues that parents of children with intellectual disabilities are 
confronted more directly than most people with the reality that we do not, in 
fact, create and define ourselves from limitless blank slates of possibility, but 
that we are, rather, creatures of God. In an essay about how parenting disabled 
children teaches parents skills that ought to be used in raising all their children, 
he argues that we have to understand all of our children as gifts, rather than as 
the products of our choices. 
For children are not beings created by our wills—we do not choose them—but rather 
they are called into the world as beings separate and independent from us. They are 
not ours for they, like each of us, have a Father who wills them as his own prior to our 
choice of them. 
Thus, children must be seen as a gift, for they are possible exactly because we do not 
determine their right to exist or not to exist. Now it is important to notice that the 
language of gift involves an extremely interesting grammar. For gifts come to us as a 
given[;] they are not under our control. Moreover, they are not always what we want 
or expect and thus they necessarily have an independence from us. 
 
 19.  Hauerwas, Timeful Friends, supra note 1, at 23.  
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Stanley Hauerwas, The Politics of Gentleness, in STANLEY HAUERWAS & JEAN VANIER, 
LIVING GENTLY IN A VIOLENT WORLD 77, 82 (2008) [hereinafter Hauerwas, Gentleness]. 
 22.  Id. 
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Insofar as gifts are independent they do not always bring joy and surprise, but they 
equally may bring pain and suffering. But just such pain and suffering is the condition 
for their being genuine gifts, for gifts that are genuine do not just supply needs or 
wants, as they would then be subject to our limitations.
23
 
The essential giftedness of human existence is more easily recognized in a 
child with an intellectual disability than a non-disabled child. A non-disabled 
child can more readily be seen as the product of a parent’s choice—she is a child 
a parent would likely have chosen. The notion of human agency in the creation 
of that child—whether the agency of the parent who chose the child or the 
agency of the child in self-defining—is not disturbed. The disabled child, 
however, is less likely to have been freely chosen by the parent. Moreover, we 
would typically assume that the child himself would not have chosen a 
disability. Thus, the very concept of agency—both the parent’s and the child’s—
is disturbed by the disability. The disability forces the parents to consider that 
their children are gifted to them by another—in Hauerwas’s theology, by God.24 
And once a parent acknowledges the essential giftedness of her child, she is 
forced to acknowledge her own giftedness, and is thus confronted with the 
fallacy of the belief that our personhood is fundamentally the product of our 
self-definition. 
Such a confrontation with the limits of self-definition is the subject of a 
poignant exchange between Hauerwas and Michael Bérubé, the author of a 
book about his experiences as the father of a son with Down Syndrome. 
Hauerwas singles out Bérubé’s wistful description of his dreams for his son with 
Down Syndrome, Jamie, as an example of the limits of modernity’s humanism. 
Bérubé writes: “I have no sweeter dream than to imagine—aesthetically and 
ethically and parentally—that Jamie will someday be his own advocate, his own 
author, his own best representative.”25 Hauerwas commented in response as 
follows: 
How sad. All Bérubé can imagine for Jamie is that he be “his own author.” That 
Bérubé can imagine no other future is not his fault. His imagination reflects the same 
limits that formed the conceptions of justice he found so unsatisfactory. What other 
possibility could there be in a world in which God does not exist? 
. . . Bérubé has been gifted with Jamie, but he lacks the practices of a community that 
would provide the resources for narrating his own and Jamie’s life.
26
 
Bérubé responds to Hauerwas by arguing that Hauerwas has misunderstood 
his use of the terms “his own advocate, his own author”: He was not 
incorporating a robust capacity for self-definition into his dreams for Jamie, but 
rather a more modest hope that Jamie would someday be able to make his own 
contributions to advocating for himself.27 Bérubé’s response directly engages the 
 
 23.  Stanley Hauerwas, Having and Learning to Care for Retarded Children, in CRITICAL 
REFLECTIONS ON STANLEY HAUERWAS’ THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 149, 155–56.  
 24.  But see MICHAEL SANDEL, THE CASE AGAINST PERFECTION (2007) (making a secular 
philosophical argument for giftedness as a fundamental attribute of personhood). 
 25.  MICHAEL BÉRUBÉ, LIFE AS WE KNOW IT 264 (1996).  
 26.  Hauerwas, Timeful Friends, supra note 1, at 16. 
 27.  Michael Bérubé, Response: Making Yourself Useful, in CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON STANLEY 
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second way in which Hauerwas argues parents of children with disabilities are 
confronted with the fallacy of self-definition as a fundamental marker of 
humanity—the more indirect and instrumental way. 
2.   The Indirect Instrumental Insight 
The more indirect and instrumental confrontation with the fallacy of self-
definition is not as exclusively accessible to parents, for it is an issue with which 
many disability rights advocates, whether parents or not, struggle. However, 
much of Hauerwas’s writing on this point is directed at parents who, as first and 
primary advocates for their children, tend to struggle with this most intensely. 
Contemporary resources for supporting parents of children with disabilities 
often begin with an introduction to current “best practices” in disability 
advocacy, in particular the “social construction model” of disability. The 
decades of the 1970s and 1980s saw the emergence in the United States of the 
“disabilities rights movement,” in which people with disabilities modeled their 
struggles for freedom and equal treatment on the civil rights movements of the 
1960s that saw the successful assertion of freedom and equality by racial 
minorities and women.28 This movement saw significant successes on many 
fronts, including the eradication of the presumption that people with disabilities 
should be segregated into isolated institutions rather than living and working in 
the community and the enactment of legislation such as the IDEA and the 
ADA. 
Central to the ideology of the disability rights movement is the rejection of 
the “medical model” of disability in favor of a “social construction model” of 
disability. The medical model of disability assumes that a disability is a 
“deficient or flawed human condition, a bodily deviation due to a ‘loss’ of 
capacity in one way or another, which holds a person back from participation in 
society. Hence, disability represents an inability, abnormality, or disadvantage 
calling for management and correction in order to restore proper functioning.”29 
Axiomatic to this model is that it is the nondisabled who must do this 
management and correction, and that the management and correction is aimed 
at making those with disabilities more like the nondisabled. The disability is 
reduced to “a problem requiring diagnosis and treatment, a broken object to be 
fixed, made better, or overcome.”30 In the process, though, “the person becomes 
reduced to a function of disabilities rather than vice versa.”31 Disability rights 
advocates argue that this model deprives the disabled of their own voice—that 
is, the nondisabled determine what is best for the disabled based on their own 
 
HAUERWAS’ THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY, supra note 1, at 31, 33. 
 28.  See HANS J. REINDERS, RECEIVING THE GIFT OF FRIENDSHIP: PROFOUND DISABILITY, 
THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY, AND ETHICS 24 n.3 (2008) (citing foundational works on the 
disability rights movement). 
 29.  THOMAS E. REYNOLDS, VULNERABLE COMMUNION: A THEOLOGY OF DISABILITY AND 
HOSPITALITY 25 (2008). 
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id. 
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views of “the normal” and impose those views on the disabled. This complaint 
is captured in the slogan: “Nothing About Us Without Us,”32 and it is given 
concrete expression by the disability rights movement’s insistence on “people 
first” language that emphasizes the person rather than the disability, such as “a 
child with Down Syndrome” rather than “a Downs child.”33 
The disability rights movement advocates an alternative model that views 
the disability as a social construct. Under the social construction model, a 
disability is more a function of the physical and social standards established by 
society as normal than a function of some defect in the body of the individual 
with the disability. It is society that disables a person who uses a wheelchair by 
constructing buildings with stairs, rather than elevators or ramps—not the 
paralysis of her legs. Under this model,  
[g]enuine healing is more than a matter of an individual’s bodily adjustment to fit 
society’s definition of normalcy. It is instead a matter of society adjusting to the 
presence of diverse people with a range of impairments. And with this we enter the 
arena of civil rights and social justice.
34
 
Although the ideology of the disability rights movement described above 
has, indeed, been a powerful force for significant improvements in the civil 
rights and justice accorded people with disabilities, it is not immune from 
criticism. For one thing, it ignores the reality of physical conditions responsible 
for some physical and cognitive disabilities that are not the product of social 
construction.35 More significant for Hauerwas’s critique of modern humanism, 
though, is the argument that the social construction model of disability is based 
on a concept of human nature in which self-representation and the freedom to 
shape one’s own identity are the paramount values. As Dutch philosopher Hans 
Reinders argues, 
Underlying the [social construction model] is an anthropological claim about the 
nature of our being. As human beings, we are free to construe the nature of our own 
being in the act of self-identification. This freedom is shaped, and thus constrained, by 
numerous cultural, political, and economic contingencies, but as ontological freedom it 
is certain. Human beings are the kinds of beings who have their existence as a task, 
not a preordained destination. This anthropological claim reinforces the appearance of 
people with profound intellectual disability as problematic.
36
 
Furthermore, this model “espouses an ethics of political activism” from which 
the intellectually disabled are also excluded.37 
[T]he suggestion that acts of will are essential in overcoming ‘disability’ is indebted to 
a model of political rationality that presupposes a liberal notion of autonomy. . . . It 
suggests that ‘emancipation from repression relies on the intellectual and emotional 
resources of the individual.’ In this respect, it clearly does not represent people with 
intellectual disabilities, let alone people with profound intellectual disabilities.
38
 
 
 32.  JAMES I. CHARLTON, NOTHING ABOUT US WITHOUT US (1998). 
 33.  See Snow, supra note 2.  
 34.  REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 29. 
 35.  Id. at 26–27. 
 36.  REINDERS, supra note 28, at 86. 
 37.  Id. at 67. 
 38.  Id. (quoting Tobin Siebers, Disability Studies and the Future of Identity Politics, in IDENTITY 
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Parents of children with intellectual disabilities are thus often confronted 
with the tension between the reality of a child whose capacity for articulating or 
constructing even a rudimentary type of self-definition is diminished, and a 
model of advocacy on behalf of that child that rejects that reality. As Tom 
Reynolds, a theologian and the parent of a son with intellectual disabilities, 
explains, 
There is a two-sided charge that obligates parents of children with disabilities. . . . 
First, there is a responsibility to affirm, nurture, and empower the unique person, 
helping to foster his or her own peculiar way of being. Second, there is a responsibility 
to encourage independence and capacity to live productively with others in society. 
However, these two charges often run against one another.
39
 
This quandary is troubling because it implicates a commonly accepted 
articulation of modern humanism’s valorization of self-definition, namely 
Immanuel Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative—never to 
treat another human as a means only. Parents of intellectually disabled children 
do, however, have to act on behalf of their children in many ways, without any 
regard to the will of the child who cannot express herself. Does that mean they 
are “using” their child as a means? Indeed, this is the quandary that Bérubé 
explains he was thinking about when he expressed the hope that his son might 
someday be his own “author.” Bérubé acknowledges that he is “caught in a 
terrible paradox—affirming autonomy and dependency at once, and for 
different reasons.” He explains, 
It is . . . urgent . . . that persons with mental retardation be represented in the public 
square when they cannot represent themselves; and it is all the more urgent that 
persons with mental retardation who have long been presumed to be constitutively 
unable to represent themselves be granted the material means to represent themselves 
as best they can. If, as is likely, Jamie cannot be his own best representative, his own 
‘author,’ in this secular sense, then he—like millions of persons with disabilities who 
cannot communicate any adequate and accurate sense of themselves to other people—
will be all the more dependent on the intercession of others.
40
 
Hauerwas suggests that this tension could be mitigated for Bérubé and 
others like him by rejecting Kant’s second formulation out of hand, as a flawed 
consequence of modern humanism’s obsession with self-definition. 
Of course, we “use” the handicapped, but we are here to be of use to one another. The 
notion that any use we make of one another can only be justified if it is done 
voluntarily can now be seen as one of the peculiar sentimentalities of modernity that 
results in self-supervision all the more tyrannical since what we do is allegedly what we 
want to do. That the handicapped are subject to care for their own good—a good they 
may not have chosen—is not an indication that such care is misguided, but rather 
requires that the good that such care is serving be properly named. After all, they (like 
us who are not retarded) exist to serve and to be served for our mutual upbringing. As 
Christians we should not feel embarrassed to discover that the mentally handicapped 
among us help us better understand the narrative that constitutes the very purpose of 
our existence.
41
 
 
POLITICS RECONSIDERED 10, 15 (Linda Martin Alcoff et al., eds., 2006)). 
 39.  REYNOLDS, supra note 29, at 75. 
 40.  BÉRUBÉ, supra note 27, at 33. 
 41.  Hauerwas, Timeful Friends, supra note 1, at 20. 
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As a non-Christian, Bérubé resists the existential insight about the 
giftedness of each human being on which Hauerwas depends,42 but he does 
accept the instrumental insight in the end by accepting Hauerwas’s critique of 
Kant’s second formulation of the categorical imperative. Bérubé acknowledged 
that, after first resisting Hauerwas’s critique, his experience with Jamie has 
caused him to realize that “Professor Hauerwas is right: In the course of our 
lives we cannot not make use of others, and how awful would it be, in ethical 
theory or in family gatherings, if we did not set out making ourselves useful to 
others.”43 The admission that “we cannot not make use of others” is an 
acknowledgement that no one can absolutely and entirely be the author of her 
own existence. 
D.   The Futility of Theoretical Engagements with the Concepts of Modern 
Humanism 
In a 2008 book co-authored with Jean Vanier, Hauerwas expanded on his 
earlier observations about the power of the L’Arche communities’ witness to a 
world structured around modernity’s deficient humanism, showing that 
alternative structures are possible.44 Hauerwas attributes the extraordinary 
strength of that witness to its subversive gentleness.45 While acknowledging the 
irony of presenting a characteristically “aggressive and confrontational” piece 
of writing to support gentleness, he contends, “My only defense is that God has 
given us different tasks. My task has been to put Vanier’s wisdom into 
conversations with philosophical and political positions that I fear are 
antithetical—if not outright threats—to the people we call ‘intellectually 
disabled.’”46 He admits that he will not be practicing what Vanier preaches: 
I do not want to learn to be gentle. I want to be a warrior on behalf of L’Arche, doing 
battle against the politics that threaten to destroy these gentle communities. Jean, of 
course, is no less a warrior. But where I see an enemy to be defeated, he sees a wound 
that needs to be healed.
47
 
With these words he puts the reader on notice that what follows will be 
something qualitatively different from the narrative approach in his previous 
writing on disability: a more abstract engagement with the theoretical basis for 
modern humanism. Tellingly, though, Hauerwas concludes that such abstract 
engagements will not accomplish anything. The more powerful impetus for 
changing the practices of modernity is the prophetic witness of those whose 
practices reflect a different understanding of humanity—in families or in 
communities such as L’Arche. 
Hauerwas takes off the gloves in this battle by naming the enemy directly—
John Rawls and his intellectual heir, Martha Nussbaum. He argues that 
 
 42.  BÉRUBÉ, supra note 27, at 33–34. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  See Hauerwas, Gentleness, supra note 21.  
 45.  Id. 
 46.  Id. at 78–79. 
 47.  Id. at 80. 
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Nussbaum’s attempt to more adequately account for the interests of the 
disabled among others in the “capabilities approach” set forth in her book 
Frontiers of Justice is doomed by her unwillingness to abandon the essential 
presumptions of the social contract theory. Hauerwas singles out two 
presumptions of social contract theory as being particularly problematic for 
Nussbaum’s attempt to account for the disabled. First is its faith in what 
Nussbaum calls “strong rationalism” aimed at avoiding appeals to intuitions and 
prejudices. Hauerwas characterizes this as liberal political theory’s “attempt to 
avoid contingency [by providing] an argument that is true without appealing to 
our experience in contingent historical conditions.”48 Second is its conviction 
that the presumption that people will act in accordance with their own self-
interest is a more realistic and secure basis for a just society than a presumption 
that people will act altruistically. 
Somewhat ironically, Nussbaum launches her critique with three intimate, 
personal stories of particular parents raising children with disabilities: Sesha, a 
young woman with cerebral palsy and severe mental retardation, the daughter 
of the philosopher Eva Kittay and her husband Jeffrey; Arthur, Nussbaum’s 
own nephew with Asperger’s syndrome and Tourette’s syndrome; and Bérubé’s 
son Jamie.49 Nussbaum acknowledges that people with significant disabilities 
have been excluded from Rawlsian accounts of justice, because they are not the 
“human beings possessed of no serious mental or physical impairments” who 
are the parties in the Original Position designing the just society.50 She argues, 
however, that this omission could be remedied if those “by whom” the just 
society is structured keep in mind all of those “for whom” the society is 
structured.51 She writes, 
One might have strong reasons for seeking such a theory and separating the two 
questions, if one starts from the idea that many different types of lives have dignity 
and are worthy of respect. If one thinks that way, one would acknowledge from the 
start that the capacity to make a contract, and the possession of those abilities that 
make for mutual advantage in the resulting society, are not necessary conditions for 
being a citizen who has dignity and deserves to be treated with respect on a basis of 
equality with others.
52
 
Nussbaum’s “capabilities” approach is an attempt to expand the Rawlsian 
understanding of “what is dignified and worthy in the human being,” and thus 
in the self-interest of those in the Original Position to maximize for all members 
of society.53 Whereas Rawls considered human rationality to be the basis of 
dignity, and measures of productivity—like income and wealth—as the sole 
legitimate indices of well-being, Nussbaum argues for a broader focus. 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach rests on an understanding of human dignity 
 
 48.  Id. at 85. 
 49.  MARTHA NUSSBAUM, FRONTIERS OF JUSTICE, 96–98 (2006). 
 50.  Id. at 16–17. 
 51.  Id. at 17. 
 52.  Id.  
 53.  Id. at 160. 
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that includes not just rationality, but also sociability and “bodily need, including 
the need for care.”54 This broader account of dignity suggests to Nussbaum that 
a more appropriate measure of the social well-being to be maximized would be 
an expansive list of various essential capabilities that incorporate people’s 
different needs and abilities.55 Nussbaum believes that if those in the Original 
Position understand their essential dignity to be enhanced by maximizing a 
combination of all of these capabilities, the interests of those with significant 
disabilities will be protected, because those interests will be included in the self-
interested calculations of those in the Original Position. 
Hauerwas contends that Nussbaum’s theory fails for two reasons. First, it 
fails logically because of her commitment to avoiding contingencies: 
The very notion of capabilities depends on close analysis of practices that allow us to 
correlate the needs of a particular person with what will satisfy those needs. But that 
kind of concreteness is not available as long as Nussbaum is determined to maintain 
Rawls’s liberal framework. It’s the same problem all over again: when we try to 
imagine politics without the contingencies of human life, people with disabilities get in 
the way.
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Hauerwas’s second argument is a critique of the social contract theory’s 
presumption that self-interest can assure a just society. He argues that 
Nussbaum has not—and indeed cannot—demonstrate that it is really in the self-
interests of the non-disabled to care for the disabled. If “justice” is defined as 
what society can achieve if it acts in enlightened self-interest, “justice” will 
never adequately provide for the disabled. A theoretical argument based on 
why it should be in one’s self-interest to care for the disabled will not convince 
anyone. Only the experience of such care will convince anyone of its value, and 
no one will rationally undertake such an obligation out of self-interest. Some 
other motivation than self-interest—such as altruism, the happenstance of 
giving birth to an intellectually disabled child, or Jean Vanier’s direction by his 
spiritual mentor to start living with two intellectually disabled men—must 
provide the impetus for the experience that teaches the value of the care of the 
disabled. In the end, Hauerwas agrees with Reinders that 
[t]here is no point in arguing with a skeptical spectator that he or she should care 
about the disabled. Instead, . . . it is crucial for a liberal society that people exist who 
are willing to engage in the practice of caring for the disabled. . . . [N]o public policy or 
theory can resolve the problem of what appears to be the burden of the lives of the 
disabled unless “it can tap [cultural] resources that motivate citizens to value the 
commitment that it requires.” After all, significance found in sharing one’s life with 
another person—a significance that will usually come as a surprise—cannot be found 
outside the activity itself.
57
 
This same skepticism about the efficacy of abstract argument on this point is 
displayed in Hauerwas’s exchange with Bérubé. Hauerwas takes a passing swipe 
 
 54.  Id. at 159–60. 
 55.  Id. at 164–68. 
 56.  Hauerwas, Gentleness, supra note 21, at 87. 
 57.  Id. at 89 (quoting HANS REINDERS, THE FUTURE OF THE DISABLED IN LIBERAL SOCIETY 
207 (2000)). 
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at engaging some of Bérubé’s attempts to defend aspects of modern humanism, 
but he concludes that these attempts are irreconcilable with Bérubé’s 
commitment to his son Jamie’s care. The only thing that justifies that 
commitment is the fact that Bérubé, by virtue of his fatherhood, had the 
experience of caring for Jamie.  
Bérubé’s criticism of Rawls and Habermas rings hollow in the light of his own 
narrative. He either cannot or does not choose to make intelligible his admirable 
commitment to Jamie. For example, with great candor Bérubé tells us that he and his 
wife are as pro-choice after the birth of Jamie as they were prior to his birth. Indeed, 
he notes that they intentionally did not use amniocentesis, assuming they would “just 
love the baby all the more” if the baby was born with Down Syndrome. He confesses 
such a stance was “blithe and uninformed” and that if they had known that their 
child’s life “would be suffering and misery for all concerned” they might have chosen 
to have an abortion. . . . Bérubé notes, however, that it is extremely difficult to discuss 
Jamie in this way. Just as it was hard to talk about him as a medicalized being when he 
was in the ICU, it is still harder to “talk about him in terms of our philosophical beliefs 
about abortion and prenatal testing. That’s partly because these issues are so famously 
divisive and emotionally charged, but it’s also because we can no longer frame any 
such questions about our child now that he’s here.” 
“Now that he is here” is the nub of the matter. Bérubé does not pretend to be able to 
do much more than represent Jamie “now that he is here.”
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And, indeed, Bérubé concedes this point in his response to Hauerwas. As 
noted above, though he cannot accept the theological basis of Hauerwas’s 
critique of modern humanism, he finds the critique convincing. Without the 
theological basis, though, he cannot explain why it is convincing. He just knows, 
from his experience with Jamie, that is it correct. He writes: 
As non-Christians, . . . we therefore find a place in Hauerwas’s model, a place where 
we, too, can be of use . . . precisely to the extent that we do not feel compelled to 
justify the existence of the mentally handicapped. . . . I will try to eschew justification 
altogether, . . . quoting something Jamie said to me last month as he fell asleep on my 
arm while we were riding a train to New York. “Daddy,” he said, groggily and with 
reference to nothing at all, “always be my friend.” As I assured him, with all my heart, 
that I would always be his friend, I couldn’t help wondering, now, where in the world 
did that come from? Thanks to Hauerwas and Vanier, I now know I need not bother 
asking. The question, like the fact of our obligations to each other, does not “come 
from” anywhere. It is simply here, now that Jamie is here, and the only thing that 
matters is that Christians and non-Christians alike respond to it with all the caritas 
they can invent or imagine.
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In summary, Hauerwas answers the questions posed by his puzzling 
language in the opening quote about how people with intellectual disabilities 
provided “the crack [he] needed to give concreteness to [his] critique of 
modernity” in the following way. What are the false pretensions underlying 
modern humanism? That man is essentially rational, autonomous, and self-
defining. Why does being “stuck with” the disabled create obligations toward 
them, even for modern humanists and why was it necessary for Hauerwas to 
 
 58.  Hauerwas, Timeful Friends, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting MICHAEL BÉRUBÉ, LIFE AS WE 
KNOW IT: A FATHER, A FAMILY, AND AN EXCEPTIONAL CHILD (1996), at 47, 48). 
 59.  BÉRUBÉ, supra note 27, at 35–36. 
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have been “drawn into”60 the world of the disabled for him to recognize how 
they expose the pretensions of modern humanism? Because the grip that 
modern humanism has on our collective minds and imaginations is so strong 
that only the immediate, direct, emotional experience or witness of a 
relationship with a human who does not conform to the false ideal of modern 
humanism is sufficient to release us from that grip. 
Although Bérubé’s attempt to express a rationale for his commitment to his 
son that is consistent with his intellectual commitment to liberal humanism fails, 
he does not deny the strength of the commitment to his son. Nussbaum’s 
attempt to reconcile her intellectual commitment to a Rawlsian social contract 
theory of justice with the commitments that friends of hers displayed to their 
children with disabilities61 is similarly futile. However, it is telling that her 
personal encounters with people with disabilities and those who care for them 
suggested to her that there is some deficiency in the Rawlsian account worth 
struggling with intellectually. Both Bérubé and Nussbaum present examples of 
modern humanists whose practices—demonstrating a strong commitment to 
caring for people with intellectual disabilities—cannot be explained by their 
intellectual commitments to modern humanism’s presumptions of rationality, 
autonomy, and self-definition, no matter how hard they struggle to do so. 
III 
UNCOVERING HAUERWAS’S INSIGHTS IN  
CONTEMPORARY DISABILITY LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
Law and the Contradictions of the Disability Rights Movement,62 by Samuel 
R. Bagenstos, one of the most prominent disability law scholars, represents 
another attempt to grapple intellectually with reconciling modern humanism’s 
presumptions with a commitment toward people with disabilities. In his 
introduction, Bagenstos explains that his interest in disability law was initially 
motivated by professional ambition: as a young lawyer in the Department of 
Justice’s Civil Rights Division, early cases brought under the ADA gave him 
the chance to argue and make new law.63 When he transitioned to the legal 
academy, he found himself intellectually intrigued by the juxtaposition of the 
politically conservative rhetoric of the disability right’s movement’s focus on 
self-reliance and independence, and the politically liberal civil rights tradition 
on which the movement based its demands for equality. Then, when his first 
article on disability rights was in the editorial process, his son was born with a 
physical disability, and he “began to see disability rights from yet a new 
 
 60.  Hauerwas, Timeful Friends, supra note 1, at 14. Hauerwas uses this same language in a similar, 
more recent non-apology for “using” the L’Arche community for an intellectual critique, even though 
he is not willing to commit to living their lives, saying, “But I am going to make the most from being 
drawn into the world of L’Arche and try as best I can to say why L’Arche has so much to teach us.” 
Hauerwas, Gentleness, supra note 21, at 78. 
 61.  NUSSBAUM, supra note 49, at 96–103.  
 62.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8.  
 63.  Id. at ix. 
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perspective. The stigma, stereotypes, and failure to take account of disability 
came home to me in an especially pointed way.”64 This combination of 
perspectives, he explains, has caused him to focus on the tensions and 
contradictions within the disability rights movement and how those tensions 
play themselves out in our legal system. 
A.   Bagenstos’s Tensions and Their Relation to Hauerwas’s Insights 
Bagenstos argues that many aspects of contemporary disability law 
commonly criticized by scholars and advocates in fact simply reflect different 
strands of thought in the disability rights movement, revealing unresolved 
tensions within the movement itself. Like all social movements, the disability 
rights movement embraces a wide spectrum of people with different concerns, 
life experiences, and ideological perspectives. Bagenstos’s account of its history, 
with the gradual development of alliances between a variety of organizations, 
local and national social movements, activists with disabilities, and activists 
caring for the disabled, stresses this wide spectrum of interests. He asserts, 
however, that all of these groups did eventually reach one point of consensus: 
the rejection of the medical model of disability in favor of the social 
construction model.65 
This rhetorically powerful consensus, though, masks what Bagenstos 
identifies as three continuing, but often unacknowledged, tensions in the 
movement. The first is the tension between the universal and the minority 
group model of disability.66 Under the social construct model, all people are 
recognized as being arrayed on a spectrum of ability; only social norms “divide[] 
the level of ability we call ‘normal’ from the level we call ‘disability.’”67 Some in 
the disability rights movement in effect accept that this dividing line has been 
drawn by society, creating a distinct minority group of people with disabilities, 
and argue that the proper policy response to this is to direct resources and 
accommodations at that group, following an affirmative action model. Others 
argue that the proper response is to reject the dividing line drawn by society, 
and focus instead on policies that recognize that everyone on the spectrum is at 
risk for manifesting some aspect of any disability, such as “the universal design 
of the built environment to embrace the largest variety of potential users, as 
well as a general rule of flexibility to recognize that all people are different.”68 
The second is the tension inherent in reliance on nondisabled professionals 
working with the disabled as doctors, psychiatrists, therapists, social workers, 
teachers, and advocates.69 Bagenstos points out that 
the critique of professionalism stood in tension with the actual practices of disability 
 
 64.  Id. at x. 
 65.  Id. at 18–20; see also supra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
 66.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 20–21. 
 67.  Id. at 20. 
 68.  Id. at 21. 
 69.  Id. at 21–22. 
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rights movement activists, who often relied on the assistance and endorsement of 
professionals who shared their views. The movement relied on lawyers, often ones 
who had no disabilities themselves, to bring disability rights cases; it relied on the 
assistance of psychologists who opposed institutionalization and forced medication; it 
relied on the nondisabled parents of disabled children, especially in efforts to secure 
educational rights; and it relied on special-education teachers.
70
 
The third tension that Bagenstos identifies is the tension underlying the 
movement’s embrace of independence, rather than welfare, as its predominant 
goal.71 The disability rights movement was generally uncomfortable with 
disability welfare programs. Some disability activists dismissed them as attempts 
to “buy off” activism that might result in more fundamental changes to 
structures of discrimination. Others were uncomfortable with the culture of 
dependence that welfare programs risk creating in the disability community. 
Others criticized the stigmatization and paternalism inherent in programs 
excusing the disabled from ordinary responsibilities of citizenship. In addition 
to these ideological arguments, Bagenstos identifies some pragmatic motives for 
framing the goals of the disability rights movement as aimed at achieving 
independence, rather than expanding entitlements. It provided an alternative to 
the civil rights frame that was facing increasing political resistance in the 1980s. 
Furthermore, it resonated with the Reagan Administration’s focus on fiscal 
conservatism and opposition to welfare programs. It also helped unite the 
members of the disability community itself, historically fragmented into interest 
groups representing specific types of disabilities. However, despite the 
rhetorical utility of independence in getting favorable laws enacted, the fact 
remains that these laws are not devoid of elements of charity and welfare. 
Bagenstos notes the persistence of this inherent tension: “Movement adherents 
claim to seek ‘independence,’ ‘self-reliance,’ and ‘self-help.’ But to obtain the 
‘independence’ they seek, they rely significantly on assistance from third 
parties,” including some of the support traditionally associated with welfare or 
entitlement programs—such as physical assistance with personal care, 
transportation, or other practical facets of daily life.72 
Bagenstos frames all three tensions as fitting comfortably under the 
umbrella of the social construct theory of disabilities. His uncritical embrace of 
that theory as a point of agreement for all disability activists, however, ignores 
the difficulties that this theory poses for people with profound intellectual 
disabilities.73 Moreover, if one considers these tensions through the lens of 
 
 70.  Id. at 22. 
 71.  Id. at 22–32. 
 72.  Id. at 32. 
 73.  See supra notes 35–39 and accompanying text. Bagenstos tends to focus on the physically 
disabled in his analysis. His discussions of paternalism do not address the hardest cases, involving 
intellectual impairments that significantly compromise a person’s capacity for any meaningful exercise 
of agency. Even with respect to physical disabilities, one scholar has criticized Bagenstos’s “complete 
rejection of the medical model of disability,” noting that “when someone cannot get out of bed to go to 
the bathroom without assistance, it is not inaccessible social structures that cause that limitation; it is 
the paralysis or weakness of the legs.” Nicole B. Porter, Relieving (Most of) the Tension, 20 CORN. J.L. 
& PUB. POL’Y 761, 768 (2011). 
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Hauerwas’s critique of modern humanism, it begins to look as though 
Bagenstos shares many of Hauerwas’s concerns, even though his allegiance to 
the social construct theory prevents him from characterizing his critiques in this 
way. The inherent tensions that Bagenstos identifies in the embrace of 
“independence” as the frame for disability rights are arguably criticisms of the 
social construct theory’s elevation of self-representation and the freedom to 
shape one’s own identity at the expense of other aspects of human need. Both 
this tension, and the tension concerning the role of professionals, are aspects of 
the instrumental quandary that so troubled Bérubé and that Hauerwas suggests 
could be addressed by releasing the hold of Kant’s second formulation of the 
categorical imperative. Finally, the tension between the universal and the 
minority group model of disability could be placed within the debate between 
theories of justice based on autonomy and those based on dependency. The 
disability rights advocates arguing for the minority group model arguably accept 
the autonomous non-disabled as embodying the “norm” that the dependent 
disabled need accommodations to achieve. Those asserting the universal model 
arguably advocate a new “norm” based on our common dependency. 
After identifying these underlying tensions, Bagenstos then analyzes how 
they are displayed in a number of areas of contemporary disability law. Two of 
the areas on which he focuses are, first, ADA jurisprudence and, second, 
beginning and end of life issues. A close look at his argument in both areas 
supports the suggestion that Bagenstos is, in fact, articulating a critique that is 
deeply compatible with that of Hauerwas, and that his argument could be 
strengthened by recognizing and embracing this critique more fully. 
B.   ADA Jurisprudence 
Bagenstos’s book has been widely heralded as an innovative contribution to 
the analysis of ADA jurisprudence.74 The more conventional explanations for 
the low success rates of ADA plaintiffs in the federal courts—particularly in the 
Supreme Court—had focused on a social backlash against, and judicial betrayal 
of, the principles of the disability rights movement embodied in the law.75 
Bagenstos, in contrast, argues that the often-criticized restrictive readings of 
what constitutes a “disability” under the ADA can actually be justified by the 
tenets of the disability rights movement, and that the discomfort some might 
have in seeing those tenets instantiated in the developing case law manifests the 
internal tensions in disability rights theory. 
The ADA defines “disability” as one of three conditions affecting an 
individual: 
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life 
activities of such individual; 
 
 74.  See id. at 772; Robert W. Pratt, Whither the Disability Rights Movement, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
1103, 1105–06 (2011) (book review); Michael A. Stein et al., Cause Lawyering for People with 
Disabilities, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1658, 1659–60 (2010) (book review).  
 75.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 1–2. 
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(B) a record of such an impairment; or 
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment . . .
76
 
In a series of cases interpreting this provision of the ADA, the Supreme 
Court has consistently narrowed the meaning of the disability definition. In 
Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.,77 Murphy v. United Parcel Service,78 and 
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,79 the Court rejected plaintiffs’ arguments that 
they were entitled to the protection of the ADA in the face of denial of 
employment opportunities because of disabilities. In each case, the disability at 
issue could be mitigated by medication—in the case of hypertension—or by 
other means, such as eyeglasses or adaptation of the brain for cases involving 
vision impairments. Even though the disability at issue was the reason for each 
employer’s denial of employment opportunities, the Court held that the 
plaintiffs were not entitled to invoke the ADA because they did not fall within 
the first prong of the ADA’s disability definition—being substantially limited in 
a major life activity.80 In Sutton and Murphy, the Court also rejected arguments 
that the plaintiffs fell within the third prong of the ADA’s disability 
definition—being “regarded as” having such an impairment.81 The Court held 
that this definition required the employers to have regarded the plaintiffs as 
being unfit for work generally—rather than simply unfit for this particular kind 
of work.82 In Toyota Motor Manufacturing v. Williams, the Court ruled that the 
plaintiff’s carpal tunnel syndrome did not prevent her from “doing activities 
that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives” even though it 
rendered her unable to perform the tasks central to her particular job.83 
Although Bagenstos does not endorse these decisions, he rejects the 
common argument that they represent a “betrayal” of the aims of the ADA.84 
Rather, he argues that they can be understood as being entirely consistent with 
different strands of the disability rights agenda. They are arguably in line with 
the independence framework that some in the disability rights community 
embraced in place of the welfare framework. Bagenstos argues that 
[i]f the ADA is understood . . . as a means of saving society money by moving people 
off disability benefits rolls and into the workforce . . . [then] the statute should focus 
on protecting those people who would be unable to work—and thus dependent on 
public assistance—without antidiscrimination and accommodation protection.
85
 
 
 76.  42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (2006). 
 77.  527 U.S. 471 (1999). 
 78.  527 U.S. 516 (1999). 
 79.  527 U.S. 555 (1999). 
 80.  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 488–89; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 521; Kirkingburg, 527 U.S. at 566.  
 81.  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490; Murphy, 527 U.S. at 522. 
 82.  Sutton, 527 U.S. at 493–94 (plaintiffs were airline pilots whose less than 20/20 vision caused 
their employer to consider them unfit to fly airplanes but not to perform other jobs); Murphy, 527 U.S. 
at 524–25 (plaintiff was considered to be unfit to drive a commercial motor vehicle but not to work as a 
mechanic). 
 83.  534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). 
 84.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 38. 
 85.  Id. at 39. 
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People trained as pilots or mechanics would presumably not be relegated to the 
welfare rolls if they were forced to choose alternative jobs.  
 Moreover, Bagenstos argues that these decisions are also consistent with the 
minority group model, even though they might be inconsistent with the 
universal model. The plaintiffs in these cases had conditions that likely did not 
put them into the ambit of the “discrete, stigmatized minority group” that 
advocates of the minority group model suggest require the accommodations of 
disability law.86 As support for his interpretation of the Supreme Court’s 
position, Bagenstos points to Bragdon v. Abbot,87 in which the Supreme Court 
accepted the argument of another plaintiff that her condition—asymptomatic 
HIV, a highly stigmatizing condition—did fall within the ADA’s disability 
definition.88 
But even if these decisions might be consistent with some strands of the 
disability rights movement, Bagenstos argues that they do not serve the 
disability rights movement as a whole. He criticizes both the independence 
framework and the minority group model as being inadequate to rectify the 
currently unsatisfactory situation of how we treat people with disabilities more 
generally, a state of affairs he calls “disability inequality.”89 With respect to the 
independence framework, he argues, 
If the goal of disability rights law is to promote equal opportunity to participate in the 
economic and civic life of the community, the law must strike at those limitations, 
even if they do not compromise individual ‘independence.’ Mere ‘independence,’ 
without equality, is not what disability rights activists really seek, and a statute 
constrained by a focus on independence is unduly limited.”
90
 
The minority group model is similarly too narrow to protect all those who 
need the protection of the ADA, since the problem of disability inequality is 
not limited to “society’s identifying a discrete class of people with disabilities 
and discriminating against them. . . . [It] also consists in the neglect of people 
who differ, physically or mentally, from the norms taken as a given by those 
who design institutions, and by those institutions’ inflexibility in responding to 
difference.”91 Moreover, the minority group model adherents’ attempt to 
identify the discrete circle of people rests on a false view that there is one single 
disability identity. In fact, however, “[d]isability identity is too multifarious, 
society’s responses to conditions identified as disabilities too diverse, for the 
notion of a societally created disability category to offer much traction.”92 
With these sorts of arguments, Bagenstos appears to be struggling to express 
a critique of the ADA that illustrates what Hauerwas might recognize as the 
inevitable frustrations of a person whose life experience and commitments 
 
 86.  Id. at 41.  
 87.  524 U.S. 624 (1998). 
 88.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 42–43. 
 89.  Id. at 46. 
 90.  Id. 
 91.  Id. at 47. 
 92.  Id. at 50. 
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confront him with the inadequacies of modern humanism. Bagenstos 
acknowledges that addressing “disability equality” demands attention to more 
than a person’s autonomy and capacity for self-definition. He recognizes the 
limits of the minority group model of disability, and its acceptance of an 
autonomy-based understanding of humanness, rather than a dependency-based 
model. Indeed, he even seems to echo Hauerwas’s critique of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach, arguing that the particular contingencies of disabled 
people’s lives render a theory based on the denial of contingencies ultimately 
unsatisfactory. But Bagenstos’s stubborn adherence to the social construct 
theory as the “unifying concept” for disability rights theory reveals the limits of 
his critique of modern humanism. 
In 2008, Congress reacted to the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the 
definition of disabilities in cases such as Sutton, Murphy, and Williams by 
enacting the ADA Amendments Act, explicitly rejecting the restrictive 
interpretations of the Supreme Court without substantively changing the 
definitions themselves.93 Bagenstos is skeptical that these amendments will 
address the problems identified above. He writes, “I doubt that a mere change 
in language would overcome the powerful momentum of the minority-group 
model and the independence frame.”94 However, he is equally pessimistic about 
the possibility of enacting a statutory definition that might reflect a more all-
encompassing “universal” approach to disability rights that acknowledges the 
aspects of human need that might not lead to economic independence.95 In the 
end, Bagenstos argues that disability rights activists should accept the limits of 
the ADA’s approach and concentrate their activism on expanding the coverage 
of public health insurance, which he sees as “the most significant barrier to 
employment and community integration for people with disabilities.”96 Though 
he does not express it in these terms, this would seem to be an appropriate 
reaction to his confronting the limits of the modern humanism underlying the 
ADA. The social welfare system accepts vulnerability and need as a legitimate 
basis for social support. Without the need to fight the rhetorical battles of 
independence, disability rights advocates could perhaps tap common moral 
intuitions, rather than arguments justified by fictional constructs such as 
enlightened self-interest. Bagenstos writes bluntly, “the effort to avoid an 
association with ‘charity’ or ‘welfare’ at all costs is an effort that makes no 
sense.”97 He cautions, though, that this does not mean that disability advocates 
should reject the indisputable value of the lessons learned in the earlier stages 
of the disability rights movement, and that “[s]ocial welfare interventions must 
be tailored to promote employment, integration, and community participation, 
 
 93.  Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2, 122 Stat. 3553, 3553 (2009) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. III 
2009)).  
 94.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 51. 
 95.  Id. at 53.  
 96.  Id. at 138. 
 97.  Id. at 136. 
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and to avoid unnecessary paternalism and dependence.”98 
But with the insights provided by Hauerwas, Bagenstos’s critique could be 
expanded and generalized. The ADA—even after recent amendments—
instantiates an inadequate notion of the human person, a notion that leaves out 
those with significant cognitive disabilities who will never be moved off the 
disability rolls and into the work force. Loosening the constrictive grip of 
modern humanism might expand the scope of the values that disability rights 
activists fight to protect to include the interests of those with significant 
cognitive disabilities. If the powerful voices of disability advocates—such as 
Hauerwas, writing from a theological perspective, and Bagenstos, writing from 
a secular, legal perspective—are converging on the same sort of critique, 
perhaps there is common ground for working together to address the more 
fundamental issues at stake in resolving the contradictions between our 
practices and our expressed commitments to the value of the lives of people 
with disabilities. 
C.   The Contradictions of Life, Death, and Choice 
Another context in which Bagenstos notes significant internal 
inconsistencies of the disability rights movement is the debates about beginning 
and end of life issues. Bagenstos notes that disability rights groups that 
generally support a woman’s right to abortion have joined forces with pro-life 
groups on three issues, making the same kind of argument in each instance: 
withholding treatment, food, or water for infants born with disabilities; right-to-
die cases; and selective abortions after a prenatal diagnosis of a disability. The 
basic argument in all three cases begins by embracing the principle of “choice.” 
However, societal stigmas and other social pressures, often presented by 
professionals without disabilities, effectively coerce people into making 
decisions that reflect biases against people with disabilities. Given that reality, 
regulation of the particular form of killing at issue is arguably not restrictive of 
free choice, but instead is necessary to preserve true freedom of choice. 
In the early 1980s, disability rights groups joined right-to-life groups as amici 
curiae in support of the Reagan Administration’s ultimately futile attempt to 
prohibit the practice of withholding medical treatment or food and water from 
infants born with disabilities.99 Their briefs included two arguments. The first 
was that “the decision to withhold treatment from an infant with a disability is 
often based on an erroneous, if not prejudiced, understanding of the ‘quality of 
 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 99 (citing Brief for the Am. Coal. Of Citizens with Disabilities et al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Heckler v. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 476 U.S. 610 (1986) (No. 84-1529), 1985 WL 
669107; Brief for the Am. Ass’n on Mental Deficiency et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, 
Heckler, 476 U.S. 610 (No. 84-1529), 1985 WL 669104; Brief for the Ass’n for Retarded Citizens et al. as 
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitoner, Heckler, 476 U.S. 610 (No. 34-1529), 1985 WL 669102); Brief for 
the Disability Rights Ed. & Defense Fund, Inc. Women’s Legal Defense Fund as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Heckler, 476 U.S. 610 (No. 84-1529), 1985 WL 669109). 
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life’ experienced by individuals with disabilities.”100 The second was that “it was 
the physicians’ biases, and not the unconstrained exercise of parental choice, 
that led to the withholding of treatment from newborns with disabilities.”101 
They argued that the parents making these choices were in states of extreme 
mental and emotional vulnerability, and that the decisions typically had to be 
made quickly. In such a situation, parents tend to rely on the specialized 
knowledge and experience of their physicians. And, unfortunately, physicians 
tend to misinform them about the nature of the disability and the prospects for 
the child’s development and future, and often obfuscate their explanations with 
confusing medical terminology to disguise the non-medical grounds for their 
recommendations—that is, their own biases against the quality of life of people 
with disabilities.102 Given the lack of authentic agency by parents in such 
situations, this decision should not be respected. 
The right-to-die cases include the highly publicized cases in the 1980s and 
1990s in which Dr. Jack Kevorkian assisted with suicides, and the Terry Schiavo 
case, involving the removal of feeding and hydration tubes from a young 
woman in a persistent vegetative state.103 Many of Dr. Kevorkian’s assisted 
suicides involved people with disabilities, prompting a group of disability rights 
activists to form an advocacy group called Not Dead Yet, which opposes 
assisted suicide and euthanasia as “a deadly double standard for people with 
severe disabilities, including both conditions that are labeled terminal and those 
that are not.”104 The disability activists of Not Dead Yet made the same two 
basic arguments in briefs filed in most of these right-to-die cases.105 The first was 
that the practice of assisted suicide reflects a discriminatory belief that life with 
a disability is not worth living. They argue that, if a person without a disability 
decides to commit suicide, society considers that an irrational choice that should 
not be respected, and society intervenes to prevent the free exercise of that 
choice. However, if a person with a disability makes the same choice, it is seen 
as entirely rational and something that should be supported.106 This reflects a 
fundamental bias about the quality of life with a disability, based on “inaccurate 
understandings about the quality of life enjoyed by people with disabilities or 
erroneous predictions about the future course of an individual’s medical 
condition.”107 Second, the social stigma associated with disability as well as other 
significant pressures—such as advice by physicians sharing these fundamental 
 
 100.  Id.  
 101.  Id.  
 102.  Id. at 100. 
 103.  Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir. 2005). 
 104.  About Not Dead Yet, NOT DEAD YET, http://notdeadyetnewscommentary.blogspot.com (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2012). 
 105.  See BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 100 (citing Brief of Amici Curiae Not Dead Yet et al. In 
Support of Appellant and Requesting Reversal, Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321 (Fla. 2004) (No. SC04-
925), 2004 WL 1713757). 
 106.  Id. at 101. 
 107.  Id.  
02_SCHLITZ_CORRECTED (DO NOT DELETE) 11/19/2012  3:56 PM 
46 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 75:23 
biases, financial issues, or the desire not to be a burden to loved ones—together 
compromise the authentic “freedom” of the “choice” of a person with 
disabilities to end her own life. Given that there is no possibility for truly free 
choices in this situation, these disability rights activists argue that the practice 
should be banned, a position upheld as constitutionally permissible by the 
Supreme Court.108 
In recent years, the astronomical increase in the number of genetic 
conditions that can be identified through prenatal testing has been the subject 
of increasing concern to a number of disability rights activists. Although some 
of these tests have a therapeutic purpose—to identify conditions that can be 
treated in utero—the vast majority of them are used to identify disabilities for 
the purpose of abortion. In response, some disability rights advocates have 
begun to develop a critique of the practice of prenatal testing for the purpose of 
selective abortion similar to the critiques of withdrawing treatment and assisted 
suicide.109 They argue that decisions to abort based on prenatal testing are 
generally misinformed, and often effectively coerced. Recent studies tend to 
show that “many members of the health professions view childhood disability as 
predominantly negative for children and their families, in contrast to what 
research on the life satisfaction of people with disabilities and their families has 
actually shown.”110 There have been many studies demonstrating that genetic 
counseling offered to parents after prenatal diagnosis tends to be influenced by 
these same sorts of negative prejudices and misinformation about the prospects 
of people with disabilities.111 The parents faced with the decision of whether to 
abort a child after a prenatal diagnosis are in states of extreme mental and 
emotional vulnerability, are typically pressured to make the decision to have an 
abortion quickly, and are thus extremely susceptible to the unfairly biased 
pressure of the “professionals” surrounding them. 
Bagenstos points out, though, that in contrast to the withholding treatment 
and assisted suicide debates, disability rights activists tend not to argue that the 
appropriate form of intervention in this choice is a restriction of the legal right 
to abortion. Rather, they typically argue that parents undergoing prenatal 
 
 108.  See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 735 (1997) (upholding Washington’s ban on 
physician-assisted suicide); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808–09 (1997) (upholding New York’s ban on 
physician-assisted suicide). 
 109.  See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 452, 
435 (2006) (citing NAT’L COUNCIL ON DISABILITY, ASSISTED SUICIDE: A DISABILITY PERSPECTIVE 
22–28 (1997)); Carol J. Gill, Health Professionals, Disabilities, and Assisted Suicide: An Examination of 
Relevant Empirical Evidence and Reply to Batavia, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 526 (2000). 
 110.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 104 (citing Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch, Disability Rights 
Critique of Prenatal Genetic Testing: Reflections and Recommendations, in PRENATAL TESTING AND 
DISABILITY RIGHTS 3, 20 (Erik Parens & Adrienne Asch eds., 2000)); see also Marsha Saxton, 
Opposition to Prenatal Diagnosis and Selective Abortion, in PRENATAL TESTING AND DISABILITY 
RIGHTS, supra, at 147, 155.  
 111.  See DEFIANT BIRTH (Melinda Tankard Riest ed., 2006); Brian G. Skotko, Prenatally 
Diagnosed Down Syndrome: Mothers Who Continued their Pregnancies Evaluate their Health Care 
Providers, 192 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 670 (2005); Parens & Asch, supra note 110, at 6–7. 
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testing ought to be presented with fuller and more accurate information about 
disabilities and the positive aspects of parenting children with disabilities, while 
endorsing a decision to abort in light of this fuller information. Bagenstos 
identifies this as another significant internal inconsistency in the disability rights 
movement. In the first two contexts, the disability rights movement argues that 
powerful social biases effectively constrain the freedom to make a choice of life 
or death. Thus, a complete prohibition of such a choice—that is, the choice not 
to treat the disabled infant or the choice to assist in a suicide—actually best 
serves autonomy.112 In the abortion context, however, the disability rights 
movement backs away from this conclusion. Bagenstos argues that the Supreme 
Court’s recent abortion jurisprudence would probably support this type of an 
argument. 
[I]t is apparent that the [Court’s] rationale for upholding the informed consent 
requirement had exactly the same structure as the disability rights critique discussed 
above. . . . Both the disability rights critics and the [Court] . . . point . . . to social 
pressures and the lack of information as significant obstacles to free choice. Although 
governmental regulation may in some ways restrict choice, it does so in an effort to 
remove even greater obstacles to free choice.”
113
 
Despite this, however, Bagenstos notes that disability rights groups have not 
joined pro-life groups in arguing for a restriction of a woman’s right to elect 
abortion after a prenatal diagnosis of a disability. 
Bagenstos concludes his analysis of this contradiction with a rather weak 
argument for consistency on the part of the disability rights community. He 
describes one group of disability rights activists that has avoided the 
inconsistency noted above by supporting the right to assisted suicide, stating 
that the group “probably constitutes a minority of disability rights activists but a 
majority of people with disability.”114 Though this group concedes that the 
decision process should be regulated to some extent to ensure unbiased 
decisionmaking, they argue that the right to make the choice of assisted suicide 
ought to be preserved. Bagenstos argues that this position is “appealing, 
because it seems to avoid the internal inconsistencies of the disability rights 
approach.”115 
In an earlier law review article on which this chapter in his book is based, 
however, Bagenstos delves a bit deeper into the implications of this internal 
inconsistency, revealing something more about the premises underlying the 
inconsistency. He searches for some way to both “endorse the disability rights 
 
 112.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 8, at 110. 
 113.  Id. at 109. 
 114.  Id. at 112. Bagenstos cites the amicus curiae brief submitted to the Supreme Court in 
Glucksberg and Quill by the Gay Men’s Health Crisis and Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund 
and “Five Prominent Americans with Disabilities” who are affiliated with the group Autonomy, Inc., 
an organization of people with disabilities who oppose the position of Not Dead Yet. Brief for the 
Amici Curiae, Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (No. 96-110), 1996 WL 711205 (1996). 
This Brief includes results of a 1995 Gallup poll finding that 66% of people with disabilities support the 
right to assisted suicide. Id. at *4 . 
 115.  Id. 
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critique while at the same time adhering to support for broad abortion rights.”116 
He argues that “gender equality” could serve as a brake on the “kinds of 
(publicly or privately imposed) constraints that we are going to treat as 
rendering a choice unfree.”117 One could accept the theory that “many abortions 
that result from prenatal testing are effectively coerced by social stigmas filtered 
through powerful professional cultures,” but also believe that 
any prohibition of a particular class of abortion will be abused to harass women who 
seek abortions more generally. Such a prohibition might also chill doctors from 
performing abortions, particularly if its terms are vague. If those risks outweigh the 
risk that disability-selective abortions will occur and harm disability equality—or if 
nonregulatory means such as public education can effectively address the harms 
caused by such abortions—then abortion should not be regulated, even if one accepts 
the critique.
118
 
Examining the premises underlying this argument reveals how 
fundamentally it is undergirded by the assumptions of modern humanism. The 
starting premise is that the right to an abortion is essential to women’s equality, 
since any restriction of this right necessarily compromises a woman’s autonomy 
and capacity to define herself.119 The fact that Bagenstos provides no argument 
in support of his starting premise is symptomatic of the hold that modern 
humanism has on the terms of the abortion debate in our country. This premise 
is asserted as the only argument he gives for his conclusion. The argument is 
that one could weigh the risk that some people with disabilities will be aborted 
because of social stigma against the risk that some women and doctors might be 
dissuaded from obtaining or providing abortions, and determine that the latter 
risk is greater than the former. And, because women’s equality must depend on 
unhindered access to abortions, one must therefore conclude that gender 
equality trumps disabled people’s right to exist. 
The contradiction that Bagenstos thus exposes in this area of disability 
rights jurisprudence makes an extremely powerful statement about the current 
social consensus that supports Hauerwas’s observation that “[o]ur humanism 
entails we care for [the disabled] once they are among us, once we are stuck 
with them; but the same humanism cannot help but think that, all things 
considered, it would be better if they did not exist.” The ADA’s abstract 
commitment to the equal worth of every person, regardless of ability or 
disability, has limits. It guarantees people with disabilities—at least within the 
ADA’s narrow definition—access to workplaces, schools, public spaces, and 
transportation. But that access does not extend to our homes or to our families. 
 
 116.  BAGENSTOS, supra note 109, at 457. 
 117.  Id. at 451–52. 
 118.  Id. This earlier article by Bagenstos provides a sensitive and nuanced effort to grapple fairly 
with many of the difficulties raised by asserting gender equality as the justification for permitting 
disability-selective abortions, including the argument that gender equality could be asserted as an 
argument for restricting sex-selective abortions. Id. at 455. Bagestenos’s book, however, seems to 
embrace the gender equality argument described above.  
 119.  For a comprehensive critique of this assumption, see Erika Bachiochi, Embodied Equality: 
Debunking Equal Protection Arguments for Abortion Rights, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 889 (2011). 
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When modern humanism’s commitment to the autonomy of women is weighed 
against its commitment to the continued existence of the disabled, the 
autonomy of women trumps. 
Bagenstos’s discussion of the inherent contradictions of the disability rights 
movement in the beginning and end of life context is subject to the same 
Hauerwasian critique as his analysis of the ADA jurisprudence on the 
definition of a disability. Again, Bagenstos seems unable to recognize that the 
“contradictions” he exposes are in fact related to the inadequacies of modern 
humanism. He identifies the inconsistency in the disability rights movement’s 
position in the right-to-die cases and the right-to-life cases, but, without any 
reasoned argument, asserts that this inconsistency should be resolved by 
favoring “autonomy”—of either the disabled person contemplating suicide or 
the woman whose freedom to create her own identity might be cramped by an 
unwanted pregnancy—over the life of the person with a disability. Indeed, his 
adherence to the contestable premises of modern humanism as absolutely 
determinative in the abortion context seems to blind him to the need to provide 
any argument for his positions, and prevents him from considering how the 
insights he has drawn from his experiences with people with disabilities might 
raise questions about his proposal for resolving this inconsistency. 
This sort of a position is perhaps the most disheartening example of the 
dangers of the practices of modernity resulting from the false pretensions of 
modern humanism. The evidence is irrefutable that prenatal testing for 
disabilities is resulting in a decreased number of children with those disabilities 
being born.120 This can be seen most clearly by examining the declining 
 
 120.  Barron H. Lerner, When Diseases Disappear—The Case of Familial Dysautonomia, 361 N. 
ENG. J. MED. 1622 (2009) (noting precipitous decline in incidence of familial dysautonomia, a severe 
neurologic condition); Babak Khoshnood et al., A Population-Based Evaluation of the Impact of 
Antenatal Screening for Down’s Syndrome in France, 1981–2000, 111 BJOG 485 (2004) (noting “a 
major impact on live birth prevalence of Down’s syndrome as a result of the increases in prenatal 
detection”); Allyson J. Peller et al., Trends in Congenital Malformations, 1974–1999: Effect of Prenatal 
Diagnosis and Elective Termination, 104 OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 957 (2004) (noting correlations 
between increases in rates of prenatal screening for various conditions and elective terminations of 
pregnancies); F. M. Lai et al., Birth Prevalence of Down Syndrome in Singapore from 1993 to 1998, 43 
SINGAPORE MED. J. 70 (2002), available at http://www.sma.org.sg/smj/4302/4302a3.pdf (noting 
increased numbers of live births of children with Down Syndrome “due to antenatal diagnosis and 
selective termination”); Lynn Gillam, Prenatal Diagnosis and Discrimination Against the Disabled, 25 J. 
MED. ETHICS 163, 164 (1999), available at http://jme.bmj.com/content/25/2/163.full.pdf (summarizing 
“the very clear evidence that in response to moderate to severe fetal abnormality, the vast majority of 
women choose to terminate their pregnancy” to support “the claim that prenatal diagnosis will cause a 
reduction in the number of people living with disabilities”); C. Mansfield, S. Hopfer & T. M. Marteau, 
Termination Rates After Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome, Spina Bifida, Anencephaly, and Turner 
and Klinefelter Syndromes: A Systematic Literature Review, 19 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 808 (1999) 
(meta-analysis of twenty international studies suggesting correlation between prenatal diagnosis of 
various conditions and pregnancy terminations). But see Jaime L. Natoli & Deborah L. Ackerman, 
Prenatal Diagnosis of Down Syndrome: A Systematic Review of Termination Rates (1995–2011), 32 
PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 142 (2012) (arguing that termination rates after prenatal diagnosis for Down 
Syndrome in the United States have decreased in recent years); G. de Graaf et al., Changes in  
Yearly Birth Prevalence Rates of Children With Down Syndrome in the Period 1986–2007, 55 J.  
INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 462 (2011) (noting that, despite increased prenatal testing in the  
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worldwide population of the “poster child” for prenatal testing for conditions 
that cannot be treated prenatally—Down Syndrome. This condition is simple to 
identify prenatally, and there are no therapeutic treatments for the condition 
once it is identified. The only way to prevent the birth of a child with Down 
Syndrome is to abort it. A 1999 meta-analysis of data from studies worldwide 
concluded that about 92% of women who receive a definitive diagnosis of 
Down Syndrome choose to abort their children.121 The absolute number of 
babies born with Down Syndrome in the world is decreasing as testing becomes 
more widespread, even though women are tending to have children at older 
ages and the risk of having a child with Down Syndrome increases as women 
age.122 This dramatic reduction in the total number of people with Down 
Syndrome clearly expresses to those living with Down Syndrome that society is 
not unified in its belief that they are just as valuable, and valued, as people 
without Down Syndrome. And if Hauerwas is correct, dwindling numbers of 
people with cognitive disabilities in the world will render their crucial witness to 
the inadequacy of the presumptions of modern humanism ever fainter. 
It is not realistic to think that focusing on the convergences of Hauerwas’s 
and Bagenstos’s critiques will resolve the contentious issue of the morality of 
abortion after a prenatal diagnosis of a disability. But perhaps an appreciation 
for the common ground between the general critiques of each of these disability 
rights advocates could give both sides a clearer understanding of the 
presumptions underlying the arguments being made. Underlying Hauerwas’s 
position is a radical critique of autonomy and self-determination as crucial to 
human flourishing. That critique is shared by many feminists and philosophers, 
and to a great extent by Bagenstos himself. However, Bagenstos does not apply 
that critique to his commitment to a woman’s right to abortion. Some disability 
rights activists, such as Adrienne Asch, while expressing a commitment to 
“reproductive choice for all women,” have articulated arguments that selective 
abortions after prenatal diagnosis are morally problematic in a way that other 
abortions are not, because of the attitudes they express.123 Asch argues that 
“[w]hat differentiates abortion after prenatal diagnosis (and abortions for sex 
selection) from all other abortions is that the abortion is a response to 
characteristics of the fetus and would-be child and not to the situation of the 
woman.” Selective abortion, she argues, “expresses negative or discriminatory 
attitudes not merely about a disabling trait, but about those who carry it.”124 
 
Netherlands, “Down syndrome live birth prevalence has risen in the last two decades as a result of 
rising maternal age”).  
 121.  Brian G. Skotko, With New Prenatal Testing, Will Babies with Down Syndrome Slowly 
Disappear?, 94 ARCHIVES DISEASE CHILDHOOD 823 (2009).  
 122.  Trends in the United States are consistent with this global trend. Studies conducted in 2004 
and 2005 in the United States show a 15% decrease between 1989 and 2005 in the number of babies 
born with Down Syndrome, even though an analysis of maternal age trends indicates there should have 
been a 34% increase. Id. 
 123.  Adrienne Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 
1990S 70 (Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989); Saxton, supra note 110, at 158–62.  
 124.  Asch, supra note 123, at 70. This argument might be termed an “expressivist” argument against 
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While Bagenstos cites Asch extensively in his article, he does not directly 
engage her argument. The major collections of writings on the morality of 
prenatal testing similarly and quite consciously make clear that a woman’s right 
to abortion is off limits for engagement.125 Perhaps appreciating the common 
ground that many on opposing sides of the abortion debate share in their 
critiques of the presumptions of autonomy and self-determination might open 
the door for a more careful consideration of the emerging expressivist 
arguments against abortion after a prenatal diagnosis of a disability. 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Bagenstos and Hauerwas represent two equally eloquent and powerful 
advocates for people with significant disabilities. Both have expended 
considerable intellectual energy confronting and trying to explain 
inconsistencies in our practices—including the practices embodied in the laws 
we enact—and our commitments to the disabled. Their personal commitments 
to this vulnerable population have led both to many of the same conclusions 
about the inadequacies of modern humanism’s presumptions that rationality, 
autonomy, and self-determination are the paramount values to be protected in 
our laws and our practices. Hauerwas reaches these conclusions as a theologian, 
from a conviction that the existence of God best explains these contradictions. 
Bagenstos reaches these conclusions as a legal scholar, from a conviction that a 
clearer understanding of the values served by the political forces shaping our 
laws best explains these contradictions. That these two scholars who have 
radically different starting points reach many of the same conclusions should 
both comfort and validate those sharing either of these divergent starting 
points. 
With respect to the areas of disagreement, a focus on the common 
commitments of each side at least helps clarify the unacknowledged premises in 
the arguments, which might enable more conversation, and perhaps more 
cooperation, despite remaining disagreements. In his essay, Intractable Moral 
Disagreements, Alasdair MacIntyre asks “what rationality requires of us in 
situations in which we confront others who are in radical moral disagreement 
with us.”126 Sometimes, even free, open, unthreatening, and noncoercive 
deliberations will not result in agreement on certain intractable moral issues—
such as the morality of abortion after a prenatal diagnosis of a disability.127 
MacIntyre asks, “When we have reached this point, how should we proceed 
further? The urgent practical question will have become that of how we may 
 
selective abortion, as Asch criticizes what the discriminatory attitudes that the act expresses. 
 125.  See QUALITY OF LIFE AND HUMAN DIFFERENCE: GENETIC TESTING, HEALTH CARE, AND 
DISABILITY 13 (David Wasserman et al. eds., 2005); Parens & Asch, supra note 110, at 12.  
 126.  Alasdair MacIntyre, Intractable Moral Disagreements, in INTRACTABLE DISPUTES ABOUT 
THE NATURAL LAW: ALASDAIR MACINTYRE AND CRITICS 1, 3 (Lawrence E. Cunningham ed., 2009). 
 127.  Id. at 18–24. 
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most effectively find common ground with at least some of those with whom we 
are in continuing and irremediable disagreement.”128 MacIntyre concludes that, 
in such situations, the most effective way to defend what he considers to be the 
precepts of natural law 
is not an attempt to demonstrate the falsity of the conclusions of [our interlocutors] . . . . 
What is needed instead is attention to the premises from which they argue and an 
attempt to undermine belief in those premises by demonstrating the flaws and 
confusions that inform those premises . . . . The best defense of natural law will consist 
in radical philosophical, moral, and cultural critiques of rival standpoints.
129
 
This sort of debating posture, however, will necessarily look very different 
from failed rational deliberation that preceded it. Quoting John Henry 
Newman, MacIntyre warns, 
“Controversy, at least in this age,” said Newman, “does not lie between the hosts of 
heaven, Michael and his Angels on the one side, and the powers of evil on the other; 
but it is a sort of night battle, where each fights for himself, and friend and foe stand 
together.” What Newman said of his age remains true of ours.
130
 
Although Hauerwas, Bagenstos, and those who share their commitments 
and presumptions, might be foes in some particular aspects of this debate, 
perhaps they might “stand together” in the fight for a more satisfactory 
combination of practices and laws affecting people with significant cognitive 
disabilities, drawing on, in Bérubé’s words, “all the caritas they can invent or 
imagine.”131 
 
 
 128.  Id. at 4. 
 129.  Id. at 52. 
 130.  Id. at 328. 
 131.  BÉRUBÉ, supra note 27, at 36. 
